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Abstract
It is widely believed that Libet’s experiment has shown
that all our actions have preceding unconscious causes.
This article argues that Libet’s claim that the actions he
investigated are voluntary is false. They are urges, and
therefore the experiment shows at most that our urges have
preceding unconscious causes, which is what also strong
libertarianism leads us to expect. Further, Libet’s correct
observation that we can veto urges undermines his claim
that our actions are initiated unconsciously and supports
the thesis that we have strong libertarian free will.
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1 Introduction
It is widely believed that Benjamin Libet’s experiment1 has
shown that our actions are caused by our brain before we even
think about them. There is still a lively discussion about Libet’s
experiment (for example in Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel 2011).
Compatibilists believe that an action’s being free is compatible
with its being the result of a causal process and that the reasons
for an action (or the beliefs in them) are amongst its causes.
Therefore at least for some compatibilists free will is compatible
with Libet’s experiment. Only stronger, libertarian notions of free
will are generally taken to be in conflict with Libet’s experiment.
Some philosophers defend free will against the evidence from
neuroscience by saying: ‘Only a very old-fashioned, mysterious
kind of free will is incompatible with Libet’s experiment. Nobody
would defend that nowadays.’ Alfred Mele for example says:
Only a certain kind of mind-body (or ‘substance’) dualist
would hold that conscious intentions do not ‘arise as a
result of brain activity,’ and such dualist views are rarely
advocated in contemporary philosophical publications on
free will. (Mele 2009, p. 67)
I hold this view that conscious intentions do not arise as a
result of brain activity; decisions are not the result of causal
processes. This view – strong libertarian free will, SLF – is the
view of free will which is most difficult to reconcile with Libet’s
experiment and which was refuted by Libet’s experiment if any
1The experiment is described in Libet et al. 1982 and Libet et al. 1983b.
Libet 1985 and Libet 1999 present Libet’s interpretation. In what follows
publication years refer to Libet’s articles unless specified otherwise.
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was. SLF may be rarely advocated in contemporary philosophical
publications, but in other centuries it may have been the majority
view, and, as it will become clear, it does not entail dualism. In
this article I defend the compatibility between Libet’s experiment
with SLF by arguing that the actions which Libet investigated
were not voluntary and may well have been caused by preceding
events, while other actions may be free.
I shall proceed by answering the following questions and de-
fending the following claims:
∙ What do I mean by ‘strong libertarian free will’?
∙ The events whose preceding unconscious causes Libet in-
vestigated (W) are not ‘intentions’ but ‘urges’.
∙ Libet deceived the readers through misusing the words
‘voluntary’ and ‘spontaneous’.
∙ What are urges? Given strong libertarian free will, urges
are to be expected to have preceding unconscious causes.
The actions which Libet investigated are irrelevant for the
question of free will.
∙ If we can veto urges, as Libet confirmed that we can, then
we have strong libertarian free will.
2 Strong libertarian free will (SLF)
(2.1) Let me state my view of free will, which can be classified
as strong libertarianism. The causal process that leads to the
intended result of an action I call the action process. If the action
process was under way before the person thought about the action
and made the decision, then the action was not free. In a free
action the action process has a beginning a part of which has no
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preceding cause, neither a deterministic nor an indeterministic
one, but its occurrence is due to the agent. It isan event that
has no preceding cause but is brought about directly by the agent.
I call such an event a choice event. Agents have the power to
make certain events pop up; through this they can initiate causal
processes. (Therefore my view can be called the ‘pop up view’ or
the ‘initiation view’.)
(2.2) So there is a third way how an event can come about,
besides being the result of a deterministic process and being
the result of an indeterministic process. This is the negation of
mechanicism, the view that every event has to be the result of
a causal process. Choice events are brought about by the agent
in the light of reasons or following inclinations, but reasons (or
belief in reasons) and inclinations are not event causes, or process
causes, or law-governed causes of the actions. Perhaps with an
unusually wide notion of ‘cause’, such as Aristotle’s notion a˚t—a,
one can call a person’s belief in a reason for which he moved
his hand a ‘cause’ of the action or of the movement, but this
relationship between the belief and the movement is very different
from the relationship to which we refer when we say that the
earthquake caused the tidal wave, or that the spark caused the
explosion. Here are three differences: First, we would not usually
say that the belief ‘brought about’ the movement. Rather, the
person brought about the movement, in the light of the reason
in which he believes. Second, the relationship is not governed by
laws of nature. Third, there is no causal process leading from the
belief to the movement. If there were, then the occurrence of the
belief at a certain time together with certain other facts would
be a complete cause of some event at each time after, so that
this complete cause determines exactly which effect will occur at
which time; as the earthquake together with certain other facts
determines exactly at what time the tidal wave will be where and
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how big.
(2.3) Whether we call the agent the ‘cause’ of the choice event,
as the defenders of agent causation do (Chisholm 1976, p. 201,
Clarke 1993, Swinburne 1997, p. 231), or whether we say that the
choice event was ‘uncaused’ (Ginet 2007) does not matter here.
That is just a matter of how the word ‘cause’ is ordinarily used
and in how wide a sense we want to use it. What matters for our
discussion of the neuroscientific data is that a choice event has
no preceding cause and that the agent initiates a causal process.2
(2.4) So I endorse the view, which Mele claims to be rarely
defended today and to entail dualism, that actions do not arise
as a result of brain activity. But it requires not dualism but the
negation of mechanicism, i.e. the view that every event must be
the result of a (deterministic or indeterministic) causal process.
It does not require dualism because a materialist could claim that
some material things can bring about choice events. That claim
is not more difficult to defend than the claim that some material
things can think or can act for reasons.
(2.5) I call this notion of free will ‘strong’ libertarian free
will in order to distinguish it from Mele’s (2006, p. 10; 1995,
pp. 211–221) or Clarke’s (2000) ‘modest libertarianism’ or Clarke’s
(1993) ‘credible agent-causal account of free will’. These views
assume that the action is caused by preceding events, but only
indeterministically. Some hold that the process of deliberation
must be indeterministic (Mele 1995), some hold that the action
itself must be caused indeterministically (Balaguer 2009), some
say that the undertaking the action was caused by the agent,
wherefore they call it ‘agent causation’, and that an action is free
if the undertaking has no preceding deterministic cause (Chisholm
2For more details see Wachter 2003 and Wachter 2009, ch. 7. Other authors
who claim that actions involve events that have no preceding cause are Ginet
(2007), Lowe (2008, p. 12), and Meixner (2004, ch. 9).
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1976, p. 201, Swinburne 1997, p. 231).
(2.6) The trouble with these views is that randomness in the
action process always diminishes the agent’s control over the
action. It is true that if an action process were indeterministic,
then it would be in some sense true that it was possible, until the
action occurred, that another action would occur instead of the
one that did occur. In this sense it is true that the agent could
have acted differently. But this is not what we are getting at
when we say that a free agent ‘could have done otherwise’. If it is
a matter of chance which action occurs, then it is not up to the
agent what he does. An action that occurs by chance is not a free
action, because the agent lacks control over which action occurs.
If an action is the result of an indeterministic, chancy process,
then the agent has as little control over it as an agent has over
an action that occurs as the result of a deterministic process.
(2.7) If Libet’s claim that in all actions ‘the volitional process
is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’ (1999, p. 47) were true, then it
would not be initiated by a choice event. Therefore, there would
be no strong libertarian free will. I shall argue that Libet has not
provided evidence for his claim.
3 The popular interpretation of Libet’s experiment
The popular picture, which Libet spread himself when discussing
free will (for example in 1999), goes like this.
In his experiment Libet told some test persons to
move their hand when they wanted to, ‘on her/his own
initiative’. (1999, p. 47) He wanted to know: ‘when
does the conscious wish or intention (to perform the
act) appear?’ (1999, p. 49) Therefore he gave the
test persons a special clock and asked them to report
the time ‘at which he/she was first aware of the wish
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or urge to act’. This first awareness is referred to as
‘W’. At the same time he measured when the muscle
activity and when a certain brain event, the ‘readiness
potential’ RP, began. The result was that W begins
200 ms (milliseconds) before muscle activity, and RP
begins 350 ms before W. Therefore ‘the volitional
process is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’, before the
agent decided and before he even thought about the
action. (1999, p. 47)
I want to show now that the experiment does not support this
claim that the volitional process in free actions is initiated uncon-
sciously. Libet misdescribed the nature of W and investigated
the wrong kind of actions. While he liked to describe W as the
‘intention’, W is nothing but an urge. Elsewhere I have argued
that the RP does not cause W but is only a preparation to move,
but for the sake of the argument I put this issue aside here.
4 Libet’s seven labels of the conscious event W
(4.1) As already Mele (2007) has pointed out, Libet used many
different labels for W, apparently randomly. Before listing the
many labels which Libet used, I want to point out which label was
used in the instructions that the test persons received. In the first
few trials ‘the subject was asked to wait [until the clock pointer
had passed a certain point] and then, at any time thereafter,
when he felt like doing so, to perform the quick, abrupt flexion
of the fingers and/or the wrist of his right hand.’ (1982, p. 324)
But for some reason, which Libet does not describe, after some
trials Libet introduced new instructions. The test persons were
instructed to ‘let the urge to act [move their hand] appear on its
own at any time without any preplanning or concentration on
when to act’. (1982, p. 324, similarly 1983b, p. 625) So, as already
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Batthyany (2009, p. 150) has pointed out, the test persons were
were told to wait for an urge and to move their hand only when
an urge arises. W was an urge and nothing else.
(4.2) Now let us see what other labels Libet used. Already in
the title of the article from 1983b W is referred to as the ‘conscious
intention to act’. The label ‘intention’ is the label Libet used
most often.3 In the summary at the beginning of the article from
1983b, Libet refers to W with the phrase ‘the reportable time
(W) for appearance of the subjective experience of “wanting” or
intending to act’ (623). The word ‘urge’ is not mentioned in the
summary at all. It is first mentioned in the introduction in the
phrase ‘conscious awareness of the voluntary urge or intention’.
(624)
(4.3) The quotation marks around ‘wanting’ are Libet’s. We
find them also around other labels of W. Their purpose may be
to indicate that the test persons used these phrases. But it is
not clear at what occasion they used them, because it is not
as if the test persons were told to move their hand whenever
they wanted to and then asked what it felt like. Libet himself
presented the experiment in later articles as if the instructions
had been thus when he writes that ‘the subject performed the
sudden flick of the wrist whenever he/she freely wanted to do so’
(1999, p. 50); but that is deceiving. The test persons were given
definite instructions to act only on an ‘urge’. Perhaps Libet used
the quotation marks in order to indicate that he uses the term
metaphorically or in a stretched sense or incorrectly. We can only
guess. He should have always used the term ‘urge’, because that
3For example, Libet called W an ‘intention’ in the title of Haggard and
Libet 2001, ‘Conscious Intention and Brain Activity’, and still in his last
article on free will he refers to W as ‘the urge or intention to perform a
voluntary act’. (Libet 2006, pp. 541, 543) Further occurrences of the label
‘intention’ for W: 1985, p. 532; Libet 1999, pp. 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55; Libet
2002, pp. 291, 292; Libet 2003b, pp. 322, 325; Libet 2006, pp. 541, 543, 545.
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term was used in the instructions and that is what W is.
(4.4) At the end of the summary of the 1983b article we read
that the cerebral initiation of an action begins ‘before there is
any subjective awareness that a “decision” to act has already
been initiated cerebrally’ (623). (Again the quotation marks are
Libet’s.) The word ‘urge’ does not at all occur in the summary.
In the body of the article, where the nature of W is discussed, we
read:
The subject was asked to note and later report the time
of appearance of his conscious awareness of ‘wanting’ to
perform a given self-initiated movement. The experience
was also described as an ‘urge’ or ‘intention’ or ‘decision’
to move, though subjects usually settled for the words
‘wanting’ or ‘urge’. (1983b, p. 627)
Here Libet says that the test persons used all these different
terms, but it is not clear at what occasion they did and whether
this tells us something about the nature of the experience. Does
it mean that sometimes W was an urge, sometimes a decision,
and sometimes a intention? Or was W always all of these three?
(4.5) The next label for W we find in the phrase: ‘the sub-
jects reported that each urge or wish [Libet’s emphasis] to act
appeared suddenly “out of nowhere”, with no specific preplanning
or preawareness that it was about to happen.’ (1983b, p. 638,
similarly 1982, p. 329) 4
(4.6) Oddly, a further label for W is used in the page header of
the article from 1983b (and therefore on every page of the article),
which is never used in the body of the text: volition. The page
header is ‘Cerebral and Conscious Times of Volition’.
(4.7) So we now have six labels for W: (conscious) intention,
urge, wish, wanting, decision, volition. Fortunately, in Libet’s
4The label ‘wish’ is also found on p. 640 of 1983b, p. 638, as well as in
many places in Libet’s later articles, e.g. 2003a, p. 24 and Libet 1999, pp. 49,
50, 51, 52, 53.
10
later articles we find only one further label: ‘desire’ (1985, p. 530).5
Nowhere does Libet clarify any of the labels or discuss the nature
of event W. Clearly, not all these seven labels apply to any one
event, even if we stretch their ordinary meanings. Often Libet
added to the correct label ‘urge’ another label, e.g. ‘urge or
decision’ (1985, p. 530) or ‘urge or intention’ (1982, p. 329, 1983b,
p. 624, and 2006, p. 541). It is of course true that ‘W is an
urge or a decision’, even though ‘W is a decision’ is false. But
given that, as I will explain, Libet’s claim that all our actions are
initiated unconsciously follows from the thesis that our decisions
are caused by RP, but not from the thesis that urges are caused
by RP, this is either an undeliberate or a deliberate deception.
5 How Libet used the words ‘spontaneously’ and
‘voluntary’
(5.1) The readiness potential had been discovered already by
Kornhuber and Deecke in 1965.6 They had instructed their test
persons to move their hand in time intervals of 30 seconds. Libet
et al. (1982) claimed to have removed this constraint:
In our experiments, however, we removed this constraint
on freedom of action; subjects performed a simple flick
or flexion of the wrist at any time they felt the urge or
wish to do so. These voluntary acts were to be performed
capriciously, free of any external limitations or restrictions.
(1999, p. 49; similarly 1983b, p. 624)
(5.2) In the first few trials ‘the subject was asked to wait [until
the clock pointer had passed a certain point] and then, at any
5‘Desire’ is used in 1983b too, but only in a general statement about ‘an
experience of conscious intention or desire to perform a voluntary act’ (640),
not specifically as a label of W.
6The German name, which is used in neuroscience, is ‘Bereitschaftspoten-
tial’, BP. Cf. Jahanshahi and Hallet 2003 and Shibasaki and Hallett 2006.
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time thereafter, when he felt like doing so, to perform the quick,
abrupt flexion of the fingers and/or the wrist of his right hand.’
(1982, p. 324, my emphasis) When discussing free will Libet often
suggested that the test persons were instructed thus to move
their hand whenever they wanted to; for example: ‘[T]he subject
performed the sudden flick of the wrist whenever he/she freely
wanted to do so.’ (1999, p. 50) But in fact after a few trials the
instructions were changed, and the results of the first trials were
left aside:
An additional instruction to encourage ‘spontaneity’ of the
act [was given to the test persons. . . . ] The subject was
instructed ‘to let the urge to act appear on its own at any
time without any pre-planning or concentration on when
to act,’ i.e. to try to be ‘spontaneous’ in deciding when to
perform each act; this instruction was designed to elicit
voluntary acts that were freely capricious in origin. (1982,
p. 324; similarly 1983b, p. 625)
(5.3) So Libet called a hand movement following an urge, which
the test persons described as coming ‘out of nowhere’,7 more
spontaneous than a hand movement which the person performs
whenever he wants to do so. The movements that Libet called
‘spontaneous’, ‘voluntary’, and ‘self-initiated’ arise not through
any thinking or deciding or willing but purely through an urge.
(5.4) The movements in Libet’s experiment were not as in-
voluntary as an alcoholic’s drinking, because the urge did not
greatly weaken the will. Therefore, as Libet emphasized himself,
the persons were free to resist the urge. But nevertheless the
movements were initiated through an urge, and such movements
one calls normally involuntary. How did Libet call them? ‘Vol-
untary’! He called them so all the time, and in his articles from
7That the urges arose ‘out of nowhere’ is confirmed by 1982, p. 324 and
1983b, p. 638.
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1982, 1983b, and 1985 he used the word ‘voluntary’ even in the
title. To reaffirm the voluntariness of the hand movement, he
also called them ‘self-initiated’.8 A ‘self-initiated’ action is one
which the person does without being pushed to do it from outside.
The person himself initiates it. But in fact the movements which
Libet called ‘self-initiated’ were not self-initiated, because they
were initiated through an urge.
(5.5) Did Libet perhaps use the term ‘voluntary’ in an unusual
way? No, the definition he provided reinforces his claim that the
hand movements were as free as any action:
In this experimental investigation and its analysis an act
is regarded as voluntary and a function of the subject’s
will when (a) it arises endogenously, not in direct response
to an external stimulus or cue; (b) there are no externally
imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly or imme-
diately control subjects’ initiation and performance of the
act; and (c) most important, subjects feel introspectively
that they are performing the act on their own initiative
and that they are free to start or not to start the act as
they wish. (1985, p. 529)
Clearly, the hand movements in Libet’s experiment, contrary
to his claims, do not fulfill condition (c), because the test persons
did not move their hand on their own initiative but on an urge,
and because Libet had instructed them to move their hand not
whenever they wanted to, but when an urge arose.
(5.6) Libet emphasized that the movements investigated were
‘self-initiated’ and ‘voluntary’ in order to make the readers believe
that those actions, which are free if any of our actions are free,
are initiated by the brain before we even think about them. Note
8Places where Libet calls the investigated movements ‘self-initiated’: Libet
et al. 1982, pp. 322, 324, 325; Libet et al. 1983b, pp. 623, 624, 625, 627; Libet
1999, pp. 48, 51; Haggard and Libet 2001, p. 57.
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the word ‘even’ in the following quotation: ‘Cerebral initiation
even [!] of a spontaneous voluntary act of the kind studied here
can and usually does begin unconsciously.’ (1985, p. 536 l) That is
to say, the actions investigated were as free as any, and therefore
all our actions are initiated unconsciously.
(5.7) What Libet tried to make the reader believe is false,
because in fact the test persons were not instructed to move
whenever they wanted to, but they were instructed to move only
following an urge. The actions that he investigated are exactly
the opposite of intentional, spontaneous, voluntary actions. They
are not voluntary, but involuntary, because not the considerations
or decision of the person but an urge initiated the movement.
They are even not clearly intentional, because the person does
not mean to move his hand. It is more suitable to call them just
‘movements’ rather than actions. They are more like convulsions
or fits than like free, intentional, voluntary actions.9
6 What is an urge?
(6.1) In order to examine whether Libet’s experiment provides no
evidence against SLF, we need to inquire: What is an urge, and
which outcome of Libet’s experiment does strong libertarianism
us lead to expect? I shall now argue that, according to SLF, an
urge to move one’s hand may well have preceding unconscious
causes and that therefore Libet’s experiment provides no evidence
for the claim that our voluntary actions are caused unconsciously
and that we thus have no libertarian free will.
(6.2) An urge is a kind of motivation of an action. Reason are
a different kind of motivation. I might eat your steak out of an
9Thus I agree with Roskies (2011, p. 20): ‘Libet’s studies definitely impact
our understanding our understanding of only a small number of our actions,
and these appear to be the ones that are least likely to matter for discussions
of freedom.’
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urge while having, and believing in, overriding reasons for not
doing so because the steak is your property. On the other hand,
I might do something for which I have no urge at all, but to the
contrary an urge not to do it or an aversion against doing it. I
am then acting on the reasons, against my urge. Of course, there
are also actions towards which the agent has an urge and for
which he has overriding reasons, for example when a mother has
an urge to protect her child.
(6.3) A reason for an action is something that the person can
consider in his mind and then act in the light of it. He has a belief
that there is this reason, and the content of that belief motivates
him. The content of the belief is that the situation requires this
action from him, or that a certain aspect of the situation speaks
in favour of this action, whether he likes it or not. The agent is
active, he takes action in response to the reason.
(6.4) By contrast, an urge is something that pushes the agent
towards a certain action. The agent is passive10, he finds himself
pushed by the urge. No reflection, consideration, or decision is
required for the action. The agent need not believe in reasons for
the action. While in motivation through reasons a belief or its
content motivates the agent, motivation through urges involves no
beliefs. The agent is being pushed towards the action. Additional
to the urge the agent might have a belief in reasons for the action,
or that he ought not to do it, but the urge can exist without such
beliefs.
(6.5) Urges diminish the degree of freedom the person has in
that situation. How free a person in general is depends on how
how many urges he has and how strong they are, how strong his
power to resist them is, and how much possibility he has over
10That agents are passive with respect to urges and desires and active with
respect to reasons has also been brought out by Batthyany 2009, p. 13 and
Lowe 2008, ch. 9
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time to weaken his urges and to develop resistance to them.
(6.6) Do urges have preceding unconscious complete causes?
That is, is there already before the urge a causal process towards
it under way of which the person is not aware? The answer is
that this need not be so but it may well be. I say ‘may well’
because the urge might occur through probabilistic processes
or at random so that one might say that it has no preceding
causes. There are two ways how an urge can lead to an action,
one with, the other without a choice event. (A) An urge could
be an inclination to produce a certain choice event. (B) An urge
could consist in a causal process which the person could stop
but which carries on if the person follows the urge. In this case,
although the person sometimes brings about choice events, in
these actions there are none. There may well be both cases. Let
us consider both possibilities.
(6.7) In case (A) there is a choice event, but before it occurs,
the agent feels an urge towards making that choice. Given the
assumption that choice events have no preceding cause, the rela-
tion between the feeling of urge and the choice event is not one
of event or process causation. Perhaps in a wider sense of ‘cause’
it can be called a ‘cause’, but not in the sense of event or process
causation. It will be some relation sui generis, we do not need to
investigate it further here. However, the feeling of urge may well
have complete causes that occur when the person has not even
thought about the action. More precisely, in that case there is at
a time before the urge a complete cause of the urge of no part of
which the person is aware and no part of which is identical with
or associated with a thought about the action. This complete
cause is a stage of a process which leads to the urge in one of
several ways, depending on which theory of the mental is true.
For example, first, in accordance with the identity theory of the
mental, the feeling of urge may be identical with a stage of this
process or a part of it. Or, second, the feeling of urge may be not
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identical with a physical event but in some other way associated
with one. Or, third, the feeling of urge may be not dependent on
a physical event.
In any of these version of (A) an urge may have unconscious
preceding causes. So the RP may be a part of a complete cause
of the urge W. That would not be evidence against SLF.
(6.8) In case (B) there is no choice event, but just a causal
process leading to, or rather heading towards, the hand movement.
At some stage a corresponding feeling of urge arises. This mental
event might be identical with some physical event that is a part of
the causal process, or might be epiphenomenal in that it is caused
by the process but does not itself cause the hand movement. The
process begins already before the urge. So there is already before
the urge a complete cause of the urge and of the hand movement.
If the person has strong libertarian free will in this situation, then
he has the power to stop the process by bringing about as choice
event some event which is incompatible with an event towards
which the process was heading. He can resist the urge by vetoing
the process and the urge. But the possibility of vetoing does
not require that the process is probabilistic. It just needs to be
stoppable.
Also in case (B) an urge may have unconscious preceding causes.
So the RP may be a part of a complete cause of the urge W. That
would not be evidence against SLF.
(6.9) I conclude that according to SLF, W, because it is an
urge, may well have preceding unconscious causes and that Libet’s
experiment therefore does not provide evidence against strong
libertarian free will. None at all.11
11That the experiment provides no argument against free will because W is
an urge has also been pointed out by Batthyany 2009, 150 f.
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7 If we can veto, we are free
(7.1) Finally I want to argue that one of the experiment’s results
that we have not yet considered provides evidence in favour of free
will. Libet claimed that all our actions are initiated unconsciously
by the RP before our first thought about the action, but he added
that we can consciously intervene and stop a process heading
towards a certain action. ‘The existence of a veto possibility is
not in doubt.’ (1999, p. 52) He presents two arguments for this:
First, some test persons ‘reported that during some of the trials
a recallable conscious urge to act appeared but was ’aborted‘ or
somehow suppressed before any actual movement occurred.’ (1985,
§ 4.1) Second, Libet conducted an experiment (Libet et al. 1983a)
where test persons were instructed to plan to move their hand at
a certain time but ‘to veto the developing intention/preparation
to act and to do this about 100 to 200 ms before the prearranged
clock time at which they were otherwise supposed to act.’ (1985,
§ 4.1) The vetoing was possible. An RP began 1 second before
the pre-set time. At the moment when the person vetoed, it was
flattened or reversed. ‘The veto findings suggest that preparatory
cerebral processes can be blocked consciously just prior to their
consummation in actual motor outflow.’
(7.2) That undermines Libet’s claim that all our actions are the
result of unconscious processes. Consider how vetoing can work.
First, the vetoing is possible proves that the process from the
urge towards the movement is stoppable. If it were Hobbesian-
deterministic, vetoing would be impossible. Now, is the vetoing
a result of a causal process? Libet, rightly in my view, suggests
that it is not:
[T]he conscious veto may not require or be the direct result
of preceding unconscious processes. The conscious veto is a
control function, different from simply becoming aware of
the wish to act. There is no logical imperative in any mind-
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brain theory, even identity theory, that requires specific
neural activity to precede and determine the nature of a
conscious control function. And, there is no experimental
evidence against the possibility that the control process
may appear without development by prior unconscious
processes. (1999, p. 53)
(7.3) Libet’s experiment suggest that the vetoing is not the
result of preceding processes, because there is before the vetoing
the same RP than in cases without veto. So the RP does not
cause the veto. Furthermore, our experience suggests that we
sometimes have urges, that we can sometimes resist them, and
that some of our actions are not following urges but are initiated
by us. We experience the urges as pushing us so that they may
well be the results of causal processes. But if we resist an urge, we
experience our vetoing as being our decision without this being
the result of causal processes.
(7.4) How does the vetoing work? The only possibility how a
person can veto an urge is that he brings about an event which is
incompatible with the process that is directed towards the action.
If the vetoing is not the result of preceding unconscious processes,
then this event, the intervention-event, is a choice event. So we
have the ability to bring about choice events. But if we have
that ability, then it is unlikely that we can use it only for vetoing
and not also for initiating action processes. So Libet’s correct
observation that we can veto urges undermines his false claim
that all our actions are the result of unconscious processes. I
conclude that Libet’s experiment provides no evidence against
strong libertarian free will because it investigated not voluntary
actions but urges, and that the occurrence of vetoing is evidence
for us having the power to bring about choice events and thus
for strong libertarian free will.
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